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This paper introduces a new methodology to target direct transfers against poverty. Our method is 
based on estimation methods that focus on the poor. Using data from Tunisia, we estimate ‘focused’ 
transfer schemes that highly improve anti-poverty targeting performances.  Post-transfer poverty can 
be  substantially  reduced  with  the  new  estimation  method.  In  terms  of  P2,  the  most  popular 
axiomatically valid poverty indicator, a 30 percent reduction in poverty from transfer schemes based 
on OLS method to focused transfer schemes, requires only a few hours of computer work based on 
methods available on popular statistical packages. Finally, the obtained levels of under-coverage of the 
poor is so low that reforms based on ‘proxy-means’ focused transfer schemes are likely to avoid social 
unrest. 
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1.1. The issue 
Transfer schemes are among the main policy tools to alleviate poverty. Cash transfers are the 
provision of assistance in cash to the poor or to those who face a risk of falling into poverty. 
The schemes (also called „proxy means tests‟) are based on predictions of household living 
standards used to calculate the transfers. Such predictions are obtained by using household 
living  standard  survey  data  for  regressing  the  living  standard  variable  on  household 
characteristics easy to observe.  
  Many countries have been using proxy means testing to target transfers, particularly in 
(1) Latin America and the Caribbean, such as Chile for many years under the Ficha CAS 
system,  Columbia  under  SISBEN,  Mexico  under  the  Oportunidades  Program,  Nicaragua, 
Jamaica, etc; and (2) Asia, such as India, Indonesia, China, Thailand and Philippines. In these 
countries, many theoretical and practical issues  related to proxy means  testing have been 
studied. The performance of the estimated transfer schemes is very variable (Coady, Grosh 
and Hoddinot, 2004). Raising their impact on poverty is of paramount importance as stressed 
in de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006b). However, the statistical foundations of these programs 
have not received the attention that it deserves. We fill this gap in this paper. 
  In this paper, we propose an estimation method of anti-poverty transfer schemes that 
focus on the poor and the near poor, thereby dramatically improving the scheme performance. 
We apply our new method to Tunisia. Our aim is to improve anti-poverty schemes and our 
methodological procedure is a part of the answer on which we concentrate in this paper. 
 
1.2. What is targeting? 
  Although living standards are measured with household surveys, they are generally 




discussed  assistance  to  poor  people  based  on  targeting  when  some  characteristics  of 
individuals can be observed, but not income.
3  Recently, Coady, Grosh and Hoddinot (2004) 
review 122 targeted antipoverty programs in 48 countries. Cash transfers based on proxy 
means tests are generally found to provide the best res ults, although there is an enormous 
variation in targeting performances. They also find that targeting performance is better in rich 
countries and where governments are accountable. Lindert , Skoufias and Shapiro   (2005) 
measure the redistributive power of 56 transfer programs in 8 countries. They find that public 
transfers can be an efficient way of redistributing income, but often fail to do so.  Moreover, 
the coverage of the poor is found far from 100 percent for the studied cash transfer programs. 
Some transfer programs are conditional on pre-specified behavior by beneficiaries (e.g., child 
school attendance or child vaccination). We do not deal with these programs in this paper. 
The interested reader can consult de Janvry, Finan, Sadoulet and Vakis (2006) and de Janvry 
and Sadoulet (2006a, b) for comparisons of conditional and unconditional cash transfers. 
In Latin America and Caribbean countries at least, there is little evidence of labor 
disincentives  from  public  transfers.  Ravallion  (2005)  argues  that  th e  tradeoffs 
equity/efficiency and insurance/efficiency restraining the scope for attacking poverty using 
transfers have been much exaggerated, and may not even be binding because of market 
failures.  So, concentrating on simple optimization programs omittin g these trade-offs and 
incentive problems makes sense. 
Ravallion and Chao (1989) model the targeting problem as one of minimizing some 
specific poverty measures subject to a given anti -poverty budget by using  geographical 
                                                            
3 For instance, see Ravallion (1991), Besley and Coate (1992), Glewwe (1992), Besley and Kanbur (1993), Datt 
and Ravallion (1994), Slesnick (1996), Chakravarty and Mukherjee (1998), Ahmed and Bouis (2002), Coady et 
al. (2002), Schady (2002), Tabor (2002a,b), Coady, Grosh and Hoddinot (2004), Coady and Skoufias (2004), 
Skoufias and Coady (2004), Datt and Joliffe (2005), Lindert et al. (2005), Africa Focus (2006), DFID (2006), 





groups of individuals. Additional correlates of household living standards can also be used 
(Glewwe, 1992).  
 
1.3. Implementation difficulties in targeting 
What are the issues arising when designing and implementing targeting methods? In 
this paper we deal with design issues, while implementation issues can be as important in 
practice. Let us briefly mention some of these.  
Beyond the targeting difficulties, which we shall discuss later, the administration of 
cash transfer programs can be complex. Eligibility is often very general, and not precisely 
defined.  One  permanent  unresolved  concern  is  how  to  distinguish  the  permanently  poor 
population from the transient poor who may need different type of support. Even when the 
entitlement conditions are accurate and clear, eligibility lists are often infrequently updated. In 
particular, many newly poor families may not reached by the transfer schemes for a long time, 
or be left on waiting list for a long time. Updating the eligibility lists is also costly and subject 
to political and social bias (as in Park, Wang and Wu, 2002). 
The temporal lag shortcomings do not stop here. The living standard predictions are 
based on household  living standard survey data that is not  collected every  years in  most 
LDCs. Using living standard prediction equation, even based on a short list of correlates easy 
to observed, implies that the estimated parameters are reasonably stable over time. However, 
in practice quality of prediction may degrade over relatively short periods of time (3 to 5 
years).  In  that  situation,  the  efficiency  gap  between  different  types  of  proxy-mean  cash 
transfers, or with price subsidies, would decline, blurred by data quality issues. Also, the risk 
of social unrest due to incorrect targeting would be heightened. This situation suggests that 
frequent household living standard surveys should be conducted when social policy much 




be seen as a reason to  abandon any use of statistical techniques altogether, but rather as 
indicating possible directions of progress in surveys. 
Although costs are likely to be much reduced when using proxy-means cash transfer 
as compared to price subsidies, the financial constraints remain important, and ultimately 
depend  on  the  political  support  obtained  by  the  cash  transfer  policy.  When  financial 
constraints are too stringent, needy families may generally be kept below the subsistence 
thresholds, even after transfers. 
The costs should include not only the total amount of monetary transfers to implement, 
but also administrative costs that may be non-negligible. 
In the literature, most measured administrative costs of transfer schemes range from 
less than 5 percent to about 15 percent of the targeting budget (See Grosh and Baker, 1995, 
Alderman and Lindert, 1998, Coady, Grosh and Hoddinot, 2002). Therefore, the conclusions 
of our study are unlikely to be offset by administrative costs only.
4 The fact that there already 
exists  in  Tunisia  small  systems  of  direct  transfers  to:  the  elderl y,  the  handicapped, 
schoolchildren, and needy families, suggest that administrative implementation on a larger 
scale is doable.  
  Moreover, overlap between different assistance programs may make their management 
difficult  and  redundant.  All  this  could  be  d ealt  with  imposing  the  administrative 
implementation of these programs. Notably, relying on decentralized administrations may be 
more efficient, as was found in  Bangladesh (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005), although more 
ambiguous results are found to West Bengal by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006).  
Another issue is that some households may change some of their characteristics by 
which they are targeted or hide their true characteristics in an attempt to receive a larger 
                                                            
4 Besley (1990) discusses the theoretical consequences of such costs and other costs of means testing. Other 
types of costs would come  from the demeaning nature of transfers, as had been observed in the US with food 
stamps. However, monetary transfers, such as pensions are generally not considered demeaning, and the poor in 




transfer.  Though, it is unlikely that the net benefit of such strategies will be non-negative for 
many characteristics, like location and dwelling types. In our results, the characteristics that 
can reasonably be modified or hidden by households (education and occupation variables) are 
precisely the ones that do not add much to the performance of the scheme.  
 
1.4. Targeting performance 
Returning  to  design  issues,  two  indicators,  leakage  and  coverage,  are  popular  for 
measuring targeting performance.  
With imperfect targeting, only poor people who are predicted as poor can benefit from 
poverty alleviation. On the other hand, non-poor people predicted as non-poor or with their 
predicted living standard beyond the chosen threshold consistent with the program budget, 
receive transfers.  Thus, two types of errors characterize imperfect targeting.  The Type I error 
(undercoverage), central in Ravallion (1991), is that of failing to reach some members of the 
targeted group.  As Atkinson (1995) noted, this failure generates horizontal inefficiency when 
compared  with  perfect  targeting.  The  Type  II  error  arises  where  benefits  are  awarded  to 
ineligible  people  under  perfect  targeting.  The  leakage  of  program  benefits  is  a  monetary 
assessment of this error, obtained by adding (1) the transfers given to those whose pre-transfer 
income is above the poverty line, and (2) the transfers received by pre-transfer poor that are 
unnecessary because the post-transfer living standards are raised above the poverty line.
5  The 
leakage ratio is obtained by dividing the leakage with the available budget. A final measure 
of the program efficiency is the reduction in poverty measures due to the transfer scheme.
6 
                                                            
5 Grosh and Baker (1995) and Cornia and Stewart (1995) do not consider the second component of the leakage 
cost. Creedy (1996) distinguishes between vertical expenditure inefficiency, equal to the leakage rati o as 
estimated by Grosh and Baker (1995) and by Cornia and Stewart (1995), and poverty reduction efficiency equal 
to our leakage ratio. 
6 Other measures of transfer efficiency have been proposed, while we concentrate on the main indicators related 
to our concerns, in part to avoid drowning the reader under figures for a paper which already contains a lot of 
them. Bibi and Duclos (2006) propose indicators of horizontal inequity, Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004) and 
Lindert, Skoufias and Shapiro (2005) propose to use the Distribution Characteristic Indicator, which shows the 





1.5. Living standard predictions 
In practice, anti-poverty targeting or poverty simulations can be based on predictions 
of  household  living  standards,  generally  obtained  from  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS) 
regressions on observed characteristics.  
For example, using data from the 1997 Egypt household survey Datt and Joliffe (2005) 
estimate  models  of  household  consumption  in  a  first  stage,  and  exploit  the  estimates  to 
simulate poverty rates obtained from changes in policy variables by assuming lognormality of 
consumption to predict expected consumption and expected individual poverty. They find that 
improving education, parental background, land redistribution, and access to health facilities 
lead to poverty alleviation. In contrast, we do not rely on lognormality assumption, often 
rejected by the data. Instead, we use predictions of conditional quantiles of living standards 
that do not depend on parametric distribution assumptions on errors, as quantile regression 
estimators are nonparametric in that sense. 
However, the OLS method is centered on the mean of the dependent variable (e.g., 
household living standard) and should provide accurate predictions around this mean mostly, 
which is often far from the poverty line. Then, the predicted living standards of the poor and 
near poor may be inaccurate. This explains why significant undercoverage of the poor is 
common (as in Grosh and Baker, 1995). This is the case when the mechanisms explaining the 
living standards of the non-poor differ from those of the poor. The latter is expected because 
poor households differ from other households not only by their capital and skills, but also by 
their access to social networks and credit possibilities, and by their economic activities. 
Undercoverage and poverty indicators are not the only possible performance indicators 
of anti-poverty welfare programs. The „distributional characteristics‟, which measure the gain 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Coady-Grosh-Hoddinott index,  which allows the comparison of the actual performance to the outcome that 




in  some  social  welfare  function  of  a  marginal  increase  in  the  transfer  budget  is  another 
indicator,  although  mostly  useful  for  small  transfer  changes.  Coady  and  Skoufias  (2004) 
decompose the distributional characteristics in a component capturing the target efficiency of 
the transfer program and another one describing its redistributive efficiency. Their simulations 
based on Mexican data show that understanding transfer performance implies to use various 
performance indicators. 
In this situation, using OLS predictions may be sub-optimal. In this paper, we use 
estimation methods that „focus‟ on the poor. This allows us to improve the predictions of the 
living standards of the poor and near poor. The method we propose can also be adapted to any 
social  program  based  on  „household  assessment‟,  that  is:  predictions  of  household 
characteristics (as in Case and Deaton, 1996, or Hanmer, Bijlmakers, Basset, Sanders and 
Chapman, 1998).  Thus, health policies directed to  ill  persons, education policies directed 
towards  underperforming  students,  pensions  to  the  elderly,  and  any  policy  associated  to 
specific intervals for a social variable that is imperfectly observed could benefit from focused 
targeting. 
Various estimation methods are possible for this purpose. For example, a semi-non-
parametric  estimation  of  the  income  distribution  could  be  implemented  by  using  kernel 
estimation methods in which correlates are parametrically incorporated (e.g., Pudney, 1999). 
Even full non-parametric estimation of conditional distributions of living standards could be 
adapted  to  the  problem  at  hand.  However,  nonparametric  methods  suffer  from  slow 
consistency,  inaccurately  estimate  the  distribution  tail,  and  are  subject  to  the 
„multidimensional curse‟ requiring unavailable large information because of many correlates 
included in proxy means tests. Moreover, analysts operating in statistical institutes in LDCs 
favor simpler estimation methods. Accordingly, Deaton (1997) emphasizes methods that can 




For these reasons we investigate two simple restrictions of the predictive regressions: 
(i) censoring the dependent variable to eliminate the influence of observations located far 
from  the  poverty  line;  (ii)  using  quantile  regressions.  The  knowledge  of  the  quantile 
regressions centered on all observed quantiles is equivalent to the knowledge of the empirical 
conditional distribution. Of course, there are too many quantiles to consider for a practical 
procedure, while good results may be obtained by just trying one quantile around the poverty 
line. Then, focusing on the poor means that the predictions are calculated by defining the 
quantile  regression  or  the  censorship  threshold  in  terms  of  living  standard  levels  judged 
representative of the poor or the near poor.  
Assume that the equation used to predict living standards has the form yi = Xi b + ui, 
where yi is the living standard of household i, Xi are exogenous correlates of living standard 
for household i, ui is an error term, b is a vector of parameter to estimate. OLS estimates 
corresponds to imposing the restriction E(yi ¤X) = Xb, which implies E(ui ¤X) = 0. Quantile 
regression estimates centered in quantile θ correspond instead to the restriction qθ(yi ¤X) = Xb, 
where function qθ denotes the conditional quantile function of order θ, conditional on the 
value of the variables X. This restriction implies qθ(ui ¤X) = 0. That is: the quantile on which a 
quantile regression is centered relates to error quantiles and not to the initial living standard 
measure. 
Then, what we predict is a chosen quantile of the distribution of the living standards 
conditionally on the correlates. This method has two shortcomings. Firstly, if the error terms 
are approximately normal, some efficiency may be lost as compared with OLS. Secondly, the 
focus is conditional on the set of correlates. That is, the chosen quantile is not that of the 
dependent variable, but the quantile of the error term in the estimated equation. However, that 
is precisely the quantile of the error that may matter most if one is interested in the prediction 




Quantile  regression,  centered  on  the  poverty  line  should  improve  targeting,  as 
compared  to  OLS,  precisely  because  they  are  centered  on  the  distribution  location  that 
identifies the poor, i.e. the poverty line threshold. Indeed, typically in regression methods, the 
prediction error is minimal at the central tendency used to define the regression method (mean 
for OLS regression, median for Least-Absolute Deviation regression, a given quantile for 
quantile regression), while it increases quadratically with the distance of the data from the 
chosen central tendency. As the living standards of the poor are usually quite different from 
the  mean  living  standard  in  a  population,  OLS  prediction  errors  are  large  for  the  living 
standards of the poor. In contrast, if the chosen quantile is close to the poverty line, the 
quadratic increase in prediction error does not occur for quantile regressions centered near the 
poverty line. 
Another important issue is that OLS estimates for anti-poverty schemes are sensitive 
to the presence of outliers, to the non-normality of error terms with finite sample size, to 
heteroscedasticity and other misspecifications. Quantile regressions deal with these concerns 
for  robustness  (Koenker  and  Bassett,  1978),  crucial  in  poverty  analysis  because  of 
measurement  errors  in  consumption  surveys  and  the  non-robustness  of  many  poverty 
measures (Cowell and Victoria-Feser, 1996). Nonetheless, using quantile regressions deals 
with non-normal errors and error outliers but not with other measurement errors. Censored 
quantile regressions  have been  found useful  to  obtain robust explanations of chronic  and 
seasonal-transient poverty (Muller, 2002). 
As mentioned above, a better focus of the scheme can also be obtained by eliminating 
part of the income distribution (the richest households for example) from the prediction. This 
suggests using Tobit regressions and censored quantile regressions instead of respectively 




Another interest of focused targeting is that it is logically related to the theoretically 
optimal transfer schemes with the transfers concentrated towards the poorest of the poor, the 
richest of the poor, or both (Bourguignon and Fields, 1997). From this theoretical perspective 
what  need  to  be  determined  are  the  transfers  to  these  sub-populations.  Then,  focused 
predictions of the living standards of the poor and near poor may generate more efficient 
transfers.  
 
1.6. Comparison with Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw 
Another field where living standard regression predictions are obtained in a first stage 
are used in a second stage for poverty simulation is the small area literature.  Thus, other 
attempts to improve the focus on the poor could be based on combining census data and 
household survey data, although Bigman and Srinivasan (2002) and Schady (2002) found that 
the improvements in targeting in India and Peru are small. More recently, Elbers, Lanjouw 
and Lanjouw (2003) provide encouraging results for poverty estimation. We do not deal in 
details with this approach in this paper as it raises additional and specific difficulties.  
However, we now spell out a few differences in the ELL techniques and our focusing 
approach.  Although  transfer  programs  based  on  proxy-means  tests  rely  on  observable 
household  characteristics,  in  contrast  with  ELL  they  use  neither  census  data,  nor  the 
information  on  the  precise  location  of  households.  Should  they  use  such  information? 
Perhaps, but they are reasons to doubt it. First, information on many household characteristics 
from census data is infamously known as being generally of mediocre quality. This justifies 
basing many analyses on specific survey data including this information rather than on the 
exhaustive  census  data.  Highly  contaminated  census  data  look  like  a  poor  basis  for 
establishing such a sensitive policy as income transfers. Second, using accurate location for 




households attempting to capture the transfers. Third, in the household living standard survey 
used  to  estimate  the  predicted  incomes,  only  very  few  local  areas  are  observed,  which 
constitutes a poor basis to introduce information on precise household location in the living 
standard prediction procedure. Four, since we do not use census data, most statistics estimated 
at cluster level would have very large sampling standard errors, which is not the case for ELL. 
On the whole, the non-use of census data and cluster dummies constitutes a major 
difference of our approach with that of ELL. This justifies that we do not attempt to estimate 
an error component model at cluster level. In these conditions we need not use simulation 
techniques  for  our  estimation  procedure.  All  our  estimates  are  grounded  on  explicit 
calculations instead. Another simplification is that because we use quantile regressions, a 
method that is nonparametric with respect to errors, we need not impose arbitrary distribution 
assumptions.  Also,  without  error  decomposition,  we  need  not  impose  ELL  orthogonality 
identification restrictions between the different components and the income correlates. This is 
important because not all analysts agree on the validity of these restrictions. 
Note that we deal with model error and sampling error in different ways than ELL. 
Namely, they are interested in the decomposition of the global estimation error of poverty 
measures into these components (and a simulation error component which does not exist in 
our case).  In contrast,  we are interested in  model  error in  that it determines  the level  of 
transfers  provided  to  each  household  type,  but  not  for  the  estimation  of  the  accuracy  of 
poverty estimators or transfer performance estimators. For the later stage, what we used is 
only the sampling standard error of these estimators as the transfer schemes to compare are 
considered as given policies. 
Finally, a complication arising in our case, but not in ELL, is the presence of a stage of 
transfer calculation from the sample of predicted living standards. This stage would much 




make intervene the whole sample of living standard predictions and not only the observable 
variables restricted to each small sample area. 
In footnote 5 of ELL, the authors claim that using quantile regressions give results 
non-significantly  different  from  using  OLS.  As  quantile  regressions  of  income  or  living 
standard  dependent  variables  have  routinely  been  found  to  significantly  vary  across  the 
quantiles used to center the regressions, we presume that they found this result using least-
absolute deviations (ie., median quantile) estimators or other arbitrary quantile. There is no 
mention of selection a given quantile to focus the quantile regression in their paper. 
Is it possible to improve anti-poverty targeting by using living standard predictors that 
focus on the poor or near poor? The aim of the paper is to explore this question. However, our 
intention is not to propose a detailed reform of the anti-poverty policy in Tunisia, nor to deal 
with all the practical implementation difficulties of such policy. Section 2 presents the anti-
poverty  transfer  schemes.  In  Section  3,  we  apply  our  new  method  to  the  1990  Tunisian 
household  survey.  In  Section  4,  we  discuss  program  efficiency  results.  We  find  that:  (1) 
focused targeting would reduce poverty much more than targeting based on OLS, and (2) 










2. Anti-Poverty Cash Transfers 
 
This paper is based on the following popular poverty measures of the FGT class (Foster 






Y z  
where z is a pre-specified poverty line, f(.) is the c.d.f. of household income y (or household 
living standard) and   is a poverty aversion parameter.
7 Naturally, our approach could be 
extended to other poverty measures. Given an anti-poverty budget, one must design transfers 
that optimally allocate this budget across households.  
Let us first consider the situation when Y (the vector of incomes in a population before 
applying the vector of transfers T={t
i, i = 1,…,N} is perfectly observed. In that case, the 
optimal transfer allocation is the solution to:
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where N is the population size, B is the budget to allocate, t
i is the non-negative cash transfer 
to household i and y
i is pre-transfer income. The objective function can be weighed by the 
household  size  (or  some  equivalent-scale)  in  each  household  to  deal  with  poverty  at  the 
individual level rather than the household level. However, for expositional simplicity,  we 
neglect for the moment the possibility that households may include several members. We do 
                                                            
7 The  (.) is the head-count ratio if   = 0, the poverty gap index if   = 1, and the poverty severity index if   = 
2. The FGT poverty measures satisfy the transfer axiom if and only if   > 1, and the transfer sensitivity axiom if 




not consider how the budget B is funded. When Y is perfectly observable, the solution to this 
problem is referred to as „perfect targeting‟ and denoted t
i for household i. 
    Bourguignon  and  Fields  (1990,  1997)  show  that  perfect  targeting  minimizing  the 
headcount ratio would start awarding transfers so as to lift the richest of the poor out of 
poverty:  
t
i = z – y
i if y
i < z, t
i = 0 otherwise 
(in  a  decreasing  order  of  income  until  all  the  budget  is  exhausted,  „r-type  transfer‟).  In 
contrast, if the aim is to minimize a FGT poverty measure satisfying the transfer axiom (α 
>1), it is optimal to start allocating the anti-poverty budget to the poorest of the poor („p-type 
transfer‟). In that case, the transfer scheme would be: 
t
i = ymax – y
i if y
i < ymax; t
i = 0 otherwise, 
where ymax is the highest cut-off income allowed by the budget. As the anti-poverty budget 
rises, ymax increases up to the poverty line, z, and perfect targeting would permit to lift all the 
poor out of poverty. 
Unfortunately, perfect targeting is not feasible because incomes cannot be perfectly 
observed.  Nevertheless,  since  the  household  living  standards  are  correlated  with  some 
observable  characteristics,  it  is  possible,  as  in  Glewwe  (1992),  to  minimize  an  expected 
poverty  measure  subject  to  the  available  budget  for  transfers  and  conditioning  on  these 
characteristics.  In  practice,  the  approach  followed  in  the  literature  or  by  practitioners  for 
designing the transfer scheme is to replace unobserved living standards by predictions based 
on observed variables. 
Let us first recall the standard procedure used in the literature for such predictions. 
Several  empirical  articles  on anti-poverty targeting have appeared in  the literature.
8 They 
generally follow a two-step procedure.  First, the expectation of y
i conditional on x
i (the vector 
                                                            
8 Glewwe and Kanaan (1989), Glewwe (1992), Grosh and Baker (1995), Ravallion and Datt (1995), Bigman and 




of living standard correlates for household i) is parametrically estimated by OLS. Then, if the 
budget allows it, each predicted poor household receives the difference between its predicted 
income  and  the  poverty  line.  Other  dependent  variables,  or  even  composite  measures  of 
welfare such as principal components extracted from multivariate analysis could be used in 
such regressions, sometimes with a change in the meaning of the objective function. Our 
method can be easily adapted to these cases. 
Some  variables  could  be  easily  modified  by  the  households,  raising  moral  hazard 
problems. We deal with this issue by avoiding as much as possible endogenous regressors, 
and  by  considering  alternative  sets  of  correlates,  defined  by  their  increasing  presumed 
sensitivity to moral hazard. 
What matters for anti-poverty targeting is the ability to identify the poor and predict 
their living standards. Our strategy is to focus on the poor and the near poor when predicting 
living standards. Grosh and Baker (1995) improve targeting accuracy when using only the 
poorest 50 percent of the population. However, we prefer to keep the information on the 
proposition of the non-poor. Indeed, econometric models based on censored variables are 
likely to yield more efficient results than those based on sample truncation since they do not 
throw away valuable information about the identification of the poor and of the non-poor.  
In this situation, if the error term in the latent equation of this model is normal, living 
standard  predictions  can  be  obtained  by  using  a  Tobit  model,  conditional  upon  some 
household  characteristics.  However,  several  issues  may  cause  Tobit  estimates  to  be 
inconsistent.  First,  the  normality  assumption  on  which  the  Tobit  model  is  based  is  often 
rejected even for logarithm of living standards. Second, heteroscedasticity is likely to arise 
from household heterogeneity. Finally, the threshold ymax may be unknown. We deal with 




We now turn to the estimation results. We start by presenting the data used for the 
estimations. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. The data 
In Tunisia, targeting transfers to poor people has become increasingly urgent because 
structural adjustment programs have imposed cuts in food subsidies, traditionally the main way 
to fight poverty. This is all the more so that the leakage from food subsidies to non-poor people 
is  considerable,  while  failure  to  substantially  serve  all  in  the target  group  is  common.  The 
Tunisian Universal Food Subsidies Program (TUFSP) is the main policy for alleviating poverty 
in Tunisia. Since 1970, basic foodstuffs have been under subsidy to protect the purchasing power 
and the nutritional status of the poor. Even if beneficial to the poor, this program was inefficient 
and costly. Indeed, about 2.9 percent of GDP was spent in subsidies by 1990 (still slightly less 
than two percent nowadays). Furthermore, the richer households received much more from the 
program than the poor. Improvement of this subsidy program has been limited by preference 
patterns, income inequality and the size of individual subsidies (Alderman and Lindert, 1998). In 
such situation, transfer schemes might alleviate poverty at a lower budgetary cost, provided that 
the method used to design the scheme performs well, as argued by Alderman and Lindert. This 
is consistent with one of the key challenges identified in Tunisia by the World Bank to meet 
the goals of the 10
th Economic Development Plan: to strengthen the performance of social 
programs  while  maintaining  budget  balances  (The  World  Bank,  2004).  Meanwhile, 
maintaining social stability through a better safety net is still a major challenge in Tunisia 
(Hassan, 2006). A former substitution of food subsidies with direct cash transfers to the poor 
ended in riots in the 1980s because the proposed transfer system was perceived as leaving 




horizontal inequity could be raised about such policies in Tunisia (as in Bibi and Duclos, 
2006). In this paper we focus on poverty. 
  We  use  data  from  the  1990  Tunisian  consumption  survey  conducted  by  the  INS 
(National Statistical Institute of Tunisia).  Unfortunately, this is the most recent complete 
national consumption survey data available in Tunisia, where official data dissemination rules 
are stringent. The survey provides information on expenditures and quantities for food and 
non-food  items  for  7734  households.  Usual  other  information  from  household  surveys  is 
available such as the consumption of own production, education, housing, region of residence, 
demographic information, and economic activities. 
  Because the estimation of equivalence scales based on cross-section data has often 
been criticized,
9 and in order to concentrate on the issue of imperfect targeting, we assume 
that per capita consumption expenditure is an adequate indicator of each household member‟s 
welfare. Other equivalence scales have been tried and provide results qualitatively similar. 
We define in Table 1 the correlates of living standards used for the predictions. The 
correlates  are  grouped  according  to  increasing  difficulties  of  observation  by  the 
administration and increasing ease of modification or hiding by households. Set I contains 
regional  dummies.  Using  it  along  with  OLS  corresponds  to  „regional  targeting‟  and  the 
regional  poverty  profile  estimated  in  Muller  (2007).
10  Set  II  includes  regional  and 
demographic information on households and characteristics of the household‟s dwelling. Set 
III adds information on the occupation and the education of the household‟s head to that in 
Set II.  The variables in Set II are unlikely to be manipulated by households and could be 
cheaply observed, yet those added in Set III are easier to conceal. So, Set II is the set to 
include in the regression analyses based on the need for these to be verifiable by program 
offices and not easily manipulated by households. 
                                                            
9 Pollak and Wales (1979), Blundell and Lewbel (1991). 
10For more information about regional targeting, see Kanbur (1987), Ravallion (19 92), Datt and Ravallion 




It  has  been  found  that  price  differences  across  households  may  affect  poverty 
measurement  (Muller,  2002).  In  order  to  correct  for  this,  account  for  substitution  effects 
caused by  the  elimination of  price subsidies  (which is  the source of  the budget  for cash 
transfers) and control for spatial price dispersion, we estimate the equivalent-gain from food 
subsidies,  . The calculus of   is explained in the working paper Muller and Bibi (2006) and 
is derived from the estimation of a quadratic almost ideal demand system (QAIDS) and based 
on a modified Blundell-Robin estimator. Both income and poverty line are converted into 
equivalent-income. Our reference price system is the one without subsidies since the subsidies 
budget is assumed to be reallocated to cash transfers. 
Then, they are four stages of estimation. (1) the estimation of a demand system to infer 
equivalent-incomes that enter the definition of living standard variable; (2) the prediction of 
living  standards  from  observed  characteristics;  (3)  the  calculus  of  the  optimal  transfers 
corresponding to the predicted living standards, using perfect targeting optimization; (4) the 
simulation of the welfare effects of the transfer scheme. Let us turn to the living standard 
predictions. 
3.2. Results for living standard predictions 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the estimation. 
Mean total expenditure per capita is TD 804 (Tunisian Dinars). Tables 3 presents the results 
of OLS regressions, Tobit regressions (censored at 10%), quantile regressions (anchored on 
the first decile) and censored quantile regressions (censored at 50% and based on the first 
decile) of the logarithm of the household consumption per capita, on Sets I, II and III of 
explanatory variables.
11 The regression predictions are applied to the whole sample, here and 
throughout the study.  Other conventions, for censorships and quantiles lead to results in 
                                                            
11 Other estimation methods could be used such as Probit models of the probability of being poor, or non-linear 
specifications for the right-hand-side variables. We tried a variety of such methods. However, to limit the length 





12 We use for the dependent variable the logarithm of the  equivalent income (i.e. 
with living standards corrected with  true price indices inferred from the estimated demand 
system).
13  Alternative results  of this paper  without adjustment or corrected by Laspeyres 
price indices are in agreement. 
The censored quantile regression estimator for dependent variable  yi and quantile θ is 
obtained as the solution to the minimisation of  
1/N ∑i ρθ[yi – max(0, Xi
‟γ)], 
where ρθ[u] = {θ – I[u < 0]} |u| , Xi  is a matrix of regressors, γ is a vector of parameters, 
N is the sample size.  
Quantile regressions correspond to replacing max(0, Xi
‟γ) with Xi
‟γ. Powell (1986) 
and Buchinsky and Hahn (1998) analyse these estimators. The estimation is obtained by a 
combination of a linear programming algorithm and sub-sample selection at each iteration of 
the optimisation. We estimate the confidence intervals of the censored quantile regression 
estimates  by  using  the  bootstrap  method  proposed  by  Hahn  (1995)  with  1000  bootstrap 
iterations.  
It has been argued that quantile regressions could help poverty analysts by choosing 
quantiles corresponding to the poor (Buchinsky, 1994). The argument is overstated since the 
quantile is that of the conditional distribution, i.e. of the error term, and not of the living 
standard. However, for predicting the living standards of the poor or near poor, since the 
prediction errors mostly stem from the error terms in the living standard equations, quantile 
regressions  anchored  on  small  quantiles  should  improve  the  predictions  for  these  sub-
populations. Then, our choice of the quantile in the quantile regressions is motivated by the 
                                                            
12  The  censorship  at  quantile  50  percent  of  the  censored  quantile  regression  is  chosen  be cause  of  two 
requirements. First, censored quantile regression estimates are inconsistent if too few observations are present in 
the uncensored subsample (a condition is needed which is unlikely with a too small sample). Second, excessive 
censoring leads to disastrous loss of accuracy in the estimation. 
13 To remain close to common practices we did not weigh the estimation by the sampling scheme. However, we 
checked that using sampling weights in this case yields similar results, in part because the sampling  probability 




focus. This approach corresponds to specifying quantiles close to the poverty line in the living 
standard regressions. 
Let us take a look in Table 4 at the ratios of the variance of the prediction errors over 
the  variance  of  the  logarithm  of  the  living  standards.
14  These ratios are  measures of the 
prediction performance of the estimation methods for the mean of the loga rithms of living 
standards. They are provided for three subpopulations: the whole population of households, 
the households in the first quintile of the living standards, the households in th e first and 
second quintiles. For the OLS, the considered ratio is equal to 1-R
2. 
The  results  show  that  quantiles  regressions  (anchored  at  quantile  0.1)  generally 
perform much better than the other methods for predicting the logarithms of living standards 
of the poor (here defined as belonging to the first or second decile of the living standard 
distribution), to the exception of censored quantile regressions that are better for the poor 
under the first quintile. In contrast, the best method for predicting the mean of the logarithms 
of living standards in the whole population is the OLS method. Predicting the logarithms of 
living standards by using Tobit regressions (with censorship at 10 or 30 percent) does not 
improve  on  OLS  predictions  for  the  whole  population  in  this  data  set.  Moreover,  Tobit 
predictions  for  the  poor  remain  much  inferior  to  the  predictions  obtained  with  quantile 
regressions,  and  censored  quantile  regressions.  Finally,  the  predicting  performance  of  the 
censored quantile regressions is disappointing for the whole population, and dominated for 
the poor in the second quintile by that of the quantile regressions. This is worrying since 
realistic  poverty  lines  in  Tunisia  lie  between  the  first  and  second  quintile.  An  additional 
difficulty  with  censored  quantile  regressions  is  that  they  rely  on  estimation  algorithms 
difficult to implement in most national statistical institutes of less developed countries. 
                                                            
14 The interpretation of the R
2 as a percentage of variation explained is dependent on the use of OLS to compute 




Then, if our business is predicting the logarithms of living standards of the poor or 
near  poor,  the  quantile  regressions  look  like  the  most  promising  method.  In  contrast, 
censoring living standards with Tobit models does not provide improved predictions for the 
poor. 
Our approach consists in exploiting the better predictions from quantile regressions for 
the living standards of the poor to improve the performance of anti-poverty transfers. Note 
that using such predictions, whatever the estimation method, for directly estimating poverty, 
would  lead  to  very  inaccurate  poverty  estimates.  However,  we  shall  show  that  using  the 
predictions based on quantile regressions is useful if the aim is to improve transfer schemes. 
Appropriate assessment will be obtained by estimating the scheme with different methods and 
examining the results. We now turn to the results of the prediction equations in Table 3, 
which, as a by-product, provide us with estimates of living standard explanations in Tunisia. 
The  signs  of  most  coefficient  estimates  (significant  at  5  percent  level)  correspond  to  the 
expected effects of variables and are consistent across all estimation methods.  
In the next step in the analysis, the predicted household living standards are used to 
simulate poverty levels resulting from the targeting scheme, first by using poverty curves. 
 
4. Program Efficiency Results 
  The calculation of the transfer  (.) in the simulations, according to the Bourguignon 
and Fields‟ rule, requires the determination of the cut-off income, ymax, beyond which no 
transfer  takes  place.  The  r-type  transfer  is:  ymax  minus  the  predicted  income,  for  each 
household predicted poor. Under perfect targeting, the ymax permitted by the budget currently 





15 However, even if the budget is suff icient to eliminate poverty under perfect 
targeting, under imperfect targeting additional resources are  necessary  and the budget is 
exhausted.  
We use a poverty line equal to TD 250 to  estimate targeting efficiency measures, 
consistently with the most credible poverty line in The World Bank (1995), corresponding to 
a head-count index of 14.1 percent. This poverty line corresponds to an  equivalent poverty 
line of TD 280 without subsidies. However, the qualitative results of this paper go through 
with poverty lines at reasonable levels, as is illustrated in the poverty curves corresponding to 
the stochastic dominance analyses shown in the working paper Muller and Bibi (2006). 
The  better  performance  of  quantile  regressions  may  be  attributed  to  the  focus 
properties of this method. However, an alternative interpretation could be that the robustness 
of the quantile regressions is what matters in practice. To control for this we run Huber robust 
regressions.  Huber  regressions  yield  almost  the  same  results  than  OLS  whether  for  the 
estimated coefficients or for the poverty curves. So, using Huber estimates does not modify 
the  coefficients  obtained  with  OLS-based  predictions,  and  is  therefore  of  no  interest  to 
improve  the  quality  of  predictions  in  that  case.  The  better  performance  of  the  quantile 
regressions for anti-poverty targeting schemes is therefore not due to robustness. However, 
poverty curves provide only qualitative insights. We now turn to quantitative estimates of 
targeting efficiency.  
 
4.1. Estimates of targeting performance 
Table  5  presents  simulation  results  for:  (1)  two  measures  of  targeting  accuracy 
(leakage and undercoverage), and (2) the levels of poverty reached with the transfer schemes 
                                                            
15 The poverty line estimated by the National Statistic Institute and the World Bank (1995)  – see also Ravallion 
and van der Walle (1993) - on the basis of needs in food energy corresponds to TD 196, the poverty lines by 
Ayadi and Matoussi (1999) vary between TD 213 and 262, and the poverty lines by Bibi (2003) vary between 
TD 227 and 295.  Poverty lines calculated by the World Bank for 1995 (The World Bank, 2000) are between TD 




and with price subsidies. As mentioned above, a poverty line of TD 280 per capita per year 
without subsidies is used, consistently with The World Bank (1995). An individual having an 
income of TD 280 without subsidies has the same welfare level with TD 250 and subsidized 
prices.  We  also  show  qualitatively  similar  conclusions  for  two  other  poverty  lines  in 
Appendix 3. To concentrate the discussion on targeting performance, we discuss the poverty 
results for P2 only. Results for other poverty indices are in the working paper Muller and Bibi 
(2006). 
We  emphasize  in  our  comments  the  comparison  amongst  transfer  methods.  The 
standard  errors  suggest  that  the  estimated  targeting  indicators  significantly  vary  with  the 
prediction  methods.  This  is  indeed  generally  the  case  when  tests  of  differences  are 
implemented, as found with bootstrap confidence intervals. The results based on regressor Set 
I, corresponding to regional targeting, show that this typical regional targeting scheme, based 
on OLS, already improves on food subsidies in terms of poverty remaining after the policy. 
However, if the aim is to reduce poverty measured by the axiomatically valid poverty severity 
measure P2, quantile regressions anchored on the first decile are best. Moreover, leakage and 
undercoverage are also lower with this method.  
However, the picture slightly  changes when we extend the set of regressors. With 
regressor Set II, which adds information on dwelling and demographic characteristics to the 
information on regional dummies of Set I, substantial improvements can be reached whether 
in terms of poverty statistics, leakage or undercoverage. Remember also that Set II is our 
chosen set of correlates for actual program offices. With Set II, the quantile regression based 
on the first quantile remains the best approach for reducing P2 and undercoverage. On the 
other  hand,  undercoverage  is  related  to  probably  indispensable  political  conditions  since 




Tunisia.  Censored  quantile  regressions  allow  us  even  larger  reduction  of  undercoverage, 
although they are less straightforward to implement.  
Using information on educational level or occupation of household head gains little 
ground.  The  quantile  regressions  based  on  the  first  decile  (and  sometimes  the  censored 
quantile regressions) remain preferable if the aim is to alleviate P2, while OLS are better if the 
aim is to cut the number of the poor down. Using censored quantile regressions anchored on 
the  first  decile  would  lead  to  the  lowest  undercoverage.  Meanwhile,  quantile  regressions 
based on the first decile, which are simpler to implement, still yield low undercoverage of 8.7 
percent, a remarkably low result. The other methods may produce disastrous outcomes for 
undercoverage.  
However, if the aim is to reduce leakage, while quantile regressions based on the first 
decile perform better than OLS, using censored quantile regressions or Tobit regressions may 
be very slightly preferable. As a matter of fact, no prediction method provides substantial 
fund  savings  through  leakage  reduction.  Leakage  always  remains  very  high  (above  68 
percent) whatever the used method. 
  Omitting price correction or deflating with household Laspeyre price indices gives 
similar results. On the whole, the quantile regression based on the first decile is best for 
diminishing P2 and perhaps undercoverage. Often, the censored quantile regressions anchored 
on the first decile with a 50 percent censorship dominate the quantile regressions based on the 
first decile for reducing undercoverage, but they seem unlikely to be used in most applied 
contexts since this method is not available in standard statistical packages.
16  
Three important points may be noted. First, the gaps between the estimated reductions 
in P2 with different prediction methods are considerable. The statistical method used to design 
                                                            
16 Note that a characteristic of the censored regression method is that it may coincide with quantile regression 
estimates for low quantile. This comes from the fact that both estimators are derived from solving linear 





the transfer scheme is a crucial ingredient of the performance of the scheme. When compared 
with other cash transfer methods, substantial improvement of the poverty situation measured 
by P2 can be obtained (from 3.85 percent with the best OLS method to 2.72 percent with the 
best quantile regression method – centered in the first decile). The percentage of excluded 
poor households from the scheme dramatically falls (to 8.6 percent) as compared with what is 
obtained with OLS predictions based on geographical dummies (for which it is 41.6 percent). 
Second,  the  usually  employed  method,  based  on  OLS  estimates,  appears  as  the  least 
performing approach compared to ways of focusing the predictions on the poor. However, 
when considering only the number of the poor, the OLS provide acceptable predictions for the 
richest of the poor that are not discounted when compared with the poorest. With limited 
budget, one could push still further the transfer performance by using quantile regressions 
centered about the poverty line for r-type transfers and centered on small quantiles for p-type 
transfers, consistently with the theoretical definitions of these transfer types. 
The censorship of the richer half of the sample is statistically too crude to make much 
impact on the performance of anti-poverty schemes through Tobit predictions even if they 
may slightly improve on OLS. Besides, Tobit regressions yield inconsistent estimates if the 
error  terms  in  predicting  equations  are  not  strictly  normal.  Getting  rid  of  the  normality 
assumption by using censored quantile regressions generally yields worse results than what 
can be obtained with quantile regressions, except for undercoverage.  
  On the whole, using prediction methods focusing on the relevant part of the living 
standard  distribution  provides  a  way  to  substantially  raise  transfer  efficiency.  Quantile 
regressions  are  natural  to  carry  out  this  task,  as  our  results  illustrates,  since  they  can  be 
centered on any chosen location of the conditional distribution of living standards. Even better 
results could be reached by trying a large set of quantiles instead of just using arbitrarily the 




results by implementing these extensive tries, akin to data mining. For example it is likely that 
centering on quantile 0.14, corresponding to the actual percentage of the poor, would be a 
good way of improve quantile predictions around the poverty line. Systematic search of the 
centering quantile, although time consuming, could be implemented in any context where a 
household living standard survey is available in order to optimize the transfer performance.  
  As shown in Appendix 2, robustness checks based on two other poverty lines yield 
similar qualitative results. In Muller and Bibi (2006), stochastic dominance tests show that the 
qualitative results for poverty measures can be extended to a broad range of poverty lines. 
 
4.2. Uniform transfers and graphs of targeting errors 
 
Results shown in Table 5 also indicate the performances of uniform transfer to the 
poor, respectively based on OLS predictions and (first decile) quantile regression predictions 
based  on  the  largest  set  of  regressors.  The  performances  are  disastrous  with  OLS-based 
uniform transfers yielding to worst reached levels of P2 and Undercoverage. They are better 
for quantile regression-based uniform  transfers,  while with  mediocre reached level  for P2 
(although only slightly less good than with optimal transfer based on OLS). However, the 
lowest  level  of  Undercoverage  can  be  obtained.  This  is  because  all  the  identified  poor 
received transfers, whereas with optimal transfers some well identified poor are not covered 
for lack of sufficient funds. 
Note  that  leakage  statistics  should  not  include  useless  transfers  that  would  raise 
households above the poverty line. If this correction is included in the leakage statistics, then 
even under uniform transfers, Leakage and Undercoverage are not mirror images. 
Figure 1 shows graphs of targeting errors against initial living standard levels for z = 




shows the percentage of the initial poor not reached by transfers. On the right of the poverty 
line, it shows the percentage of the non-poor unduly receiving transfers. 
One can see that OLS and quantile regressions essentially differ by their capacity to 
calculate well transfers for the extremely poor households, while their performances are closer 
for households around the poverty lines. On the other hand, the OLS would better target non-
poor households if it were necessary, These features are apparent whether optimal transfer 
amounts are calculated when using the predictions (in graphs 1 and 2) or if pro-poor uniform 
transfers are used (in graphs 3 and 4). Graphs 3 and 4 also correspond on the left of the 
poverty line to the percentage of ex-post poor for each level of initial living standard. This is 
because with uniform transfers and the chosen poverty line there is enough budget to lift all 
the poor who can be identified above the poverty line. 
These graphs allow the visual separation of the performances of the pure targeting 
transfer  schemes  (graphs  3  and  4)  from  optimized  transfer  schemes  (graphs  1  and  2). 
Additional ex-post targeting errors could be caused by adjusting the transfer levels to the 
predicted living standards. Indeed, with optimized transfers and the available budget, not all 
households  can  be  served  by  the  transfer  scheme.  In  contrast,  with  uniform  transfers  all 
households identified as poor are served but they receive amounts that are not related to their 
living standard level. 
For uniform transfers, the bulk of targeting errors from OLS are below the poverty line 
and substantial. They are much less substantial for optimized OLS transfers, for which the 
errors elicit a smooth peak at the center of the graph. In contrast, decile-regression targeting 
errors are much smaller at the left of the poverty line, whether for optimized or uniform 
transfers. Meanwhile, in the right of the poverty line these errors are larger than than from 
OLS. All these features fit well with the predicted statistics of Table 4. However, decile-




transfers. This is because with the considered transfer budget and poverty line, only about 3.5 
percent of households are simultaneously identified as poor (using quantile regressions based 
on the larger set of variables) and cannot be served because of budget exhaustion. It appears 
that  the  main  gain  obtained  from  moving  from  uniform  to  optimized  transfers,  as  far  as 
targeting based on decile regressions is concerned, occurs around the tried poverty line in 
Tunisia. The graphs make clear that the use of quantile regressions is important for better 
targeting of the poor, whether for uniform or optimized transfers. 
 
 
4.3. Policy consequences 
What are the policy consequences of our new method of focused transfer schemes? 
Clearly, highly improved performances can be attained by adapting the statistical method 
used  for  the  prediction  of  living  standards.  Lower  poverty  levels,  smaller  leakage  and 
undercoverage statistics can be obtained by focusing the estimation of transfer schemes. In 
Tunisia, the gain of efficiency, notably in terms of undercoverage, is so large that it should 
deserve serious policy consideration. In terms of P2, the most popular axiomatically valid 
poverty indicator, 3.9 percent is the level reached with the best OLS method. An additional 
reduction down to 2.7 percent, that is another half reduction in poverty, requires only a few 
hours of simple statistical work easy to do with common package (e.g., Eviews or Stata). 
Moreover,  this  reduction  is  much  larger  than  that  obtained  by  adding  education  and 
occupation variables to the list of regressors in OLS regressions. 
The  econometric  results  have  shown  that  decisive  progress  can  be  reached  in  the 
design of the scheme. The choice of the econometric method for predicting living standards is 
crucial for the performance of the transfer scheme. Adopting an econometric method that 




quantile regression centered on a quantile close to the expected poverty line provides the best 
results. 
There is already a small transfer scheme in operations in Tunisia: the „Programme des 
Familles  N￩cessiteuses‟  (R￩publique  Tunisienne,  1991).  However,  to  implement  a  large 
transfer program would necessitate raising large funds. A logical consequence of our analysis 
is  to  make  possible the  transfer  of  some  of  the  public  funds  allocated  to  price  subsidies 
towards a national focused transfer scheme.  
But growth is not everything. Previous attempts at eliminating subsidies in Tunisia 
ended in riots. Indeed, since all the poor, and other population categories, benefit from price 
subsidies, an economically better aid system to the poor based on direct cash transfers may 
alleviate poverty, but  may  also  leave  aside a large proportion  of the poor.  If this  risk is 
perceived as high by the population, social unrest may follow, especially because the Tunisian 
society is very aware of social policies. Therefore, replacing subsidies by OLS-based transfers 
is likely to be impossible. Indeed, our results show that about between one quarter and one 
fifth  of  the  poor  would  be  excluded  from  the  benefits  of  such  transfers  and  would 
simultaneously lose the benefits they extract from subsidies. Another possibility would be to 
replace  food  subsidies  with  targeted  food  subsidies  based  on  proxy-means  programs. 
However,  this  seems  difficult  since  it  would  imply  to  be  able  to  administrate  many 
expenditure transactions by targeted households. 
However,  using  focused  transfers,  would  allow  the  government  to  reduce  the 
undercoverage of the scheme to such a level (at most 8.6 percent of the poor in our estimates, 
which could still be improved), that: (1) the reform should be politically viable, and (2) the 
reform would not generate severe risks for a large proportion of the poor. As a matter of fact, 
it seems exceptional that such a limited proportion of the population would suffer from a large 




distortions, and the saving of public funds, the actual percentage of the poor suffering from 




Leakage  to  the  non-poor  is  often  substantial  from  universal  food  price  subsidy 
programs directed to the poor. Because of their large budgetary cost, many governments have 
moved away from them towards better targeted methods, such as proxy-means cash transfer. 
Indeed, benefits can be awarded to the poor contingently on their characteristics. However, 
transfer schemes may be inaccurate because the statistical predictions involved in their design 
are centered on the mean of the living standard distribution and not enough oriented towards 
the potentially poor.  
This paper improves on past methods by focusing on the poor and near poor for the 
design of transfer schemes based on estimated living standard equations.
17 This is achieved by 
using quantile regressions and censorship for the prediction of living standards. This is not the 
object of the paper to delve into detailed practical analysis of the Tunisian anti-poverty policy 
or to deal with all the implementation difficulties of this policy. 
Our estimation results based on data from Tunisia reveal considerable potentialities for 
poverty alleviation with our new approach. The improvement is also substantial as compared 
to usual targeting schemes based on OLS predictions: with our method  based on quantile 
regressions  poverty could  be  massively reduced  in Tunisia.  Moreover,  large  reduction in 
undercoverage  is  possible, even  when  compared  with  the best  OLS -based  transfers.  In 
contrast,  censoring the living standard distribution  does not  improve the performance of 
transfer schemes, except for reducing undercoverage.  
                                                            





Targeting by indicators may be relatively cheap to implement, when compared to the 
huge financial burden of price subsidies. This is notably the case when it can be carried out 
just after a national census since the variables contributing to the efficacy of the transfer 
scheme are then easy to observe from a census. Moreover, in such situation the scheme could 
be  improved  by  using  the  methods  in  Elbers,  Lanjouw  and  Lanjouw  (2003),  taking  full 
advantage of the census information for small area targeting.
18  
  Other econometric ways of focusing on the poor are possible,  for example by using 
non-parametric regressions, shadowing the shape of the living standard distribution. It is 
unclear what the optimal econometric techniques to use to implement this focus concern  are 
and we conjecture that they may depend on the data at  hand. On the whole, the important 
point in our approach is the adaptation of the estimation method for household living standard 
predictions in order to improve the performance of the anti -poverty targeting scheme. Using 
quantile regression improves this performance dramatically in the case of Tunisia. However, 
other variants and improvement are probably possible and left for future work. 
                                                            
18 It is likely that poverty mapping can be  improved by estimating methods focusing on the poor. We leave this 
question for future work. Finally, the assessment of the welfare impact of public spending (van de Walle, 1998) 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
Table 1: Definition of the variables 



































1 if household lives in Great Tunis, 0 otherwise.  
1 if household lives in Region Northeast, 0 otherwise.  
1 if household lives in Region Northwest, 0 otherwise. 
1 if household lives in Region Middle east, 0 otherwise. 
1 if household lives in Region Middle west, 0 otherwise. 
1 if household lives in Sfax, 0 otherwise. 
1 if household lives in Region Southeast, 0 otherwise. 
1 if household lives in Region Southwest, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Number of children in household old less than 2 years old. 
Number of children aged between 3 and 6 years. 
Number of children aged between 7 and 11 years. 
Number of adults aged between 12 and 18 years. 
Number of adults old more than 19 years. 
Age of the household head (HH). 
Squared age of the HH. 
 
 
Number of rooms per capita 
1 if household lives in a detached house, 0 otherwise. 
1 if household lives in a flat, 0 otherwise. 
1 if household lives in an Arab house, 0 otherwise. 
1 if household lives in a hovel, 0 otherwise. 
  
 
1 if household is owner of the house.  
1 if household is renting a house. 
1 if household has a leasing agreement for his house 



























Complement for Set III: 





























Dummy variable for HH is unemployed. 
Dummy variable for HH living in the Southeast and agricultural labourer. 
Dummy variable for if HH living in the Southwest and agricultural labourer. 
Dummy variable for if HH living in another region and agricultural labourer. 
Dummy variable for if HH is an industry worker. 
Dummy variable for if HH is a farmer. 
Dummy variable for if HH living in the Northwest and agricultural farmer. 
Dummy variable for if HH is self-employed or manager. 
Dummy variable for if HH has another type of job. 
 
Number of participants in the household‟s budget. 
Number of female workers. 
Number of male workers. 
 
 
Dummy variable for HH is illiterate. 
Dummy variable for HH has a primary schooling level. 
Dummy variable for HH has a junior secondary schooling level. 
Dummy variable for HH has a senior secondary schooling level. 
Dummy variable for HH has a higher educational level. 
 
Number of students. 
Number of children in private secondary school. 
Number of children in public secondary school. 
Number of children in private primary school. 
Number of children in public primary school. 
 
HH = „household head‟. Zone 1 corresponds to Greater Tunis, the most prosperous region and largest industrial center. Zone 
5 corresponds to the Middle East (Sousse, Monastir, Mahdia), which is the second economic region of Tunisia. It is reputed 
for its thriving tourist industry. Since Zones 1 and 5 are omitted, the sign of the coefficients of the other zones should be 
negative in the prediction equation of living standards. Zone 2 is the Northeast (Nabeul, Bizerte, Zaghouen), which is the 
third most important economic region of Tunisia. We expect the coefficient of this variable to have the smallest magnitude 
among the zone coefficients in the prediction equation. Zone 3 corresponds to the Northwest where the highest poverty 
incidence is. Its coefficient should have the largest magnitude among the zone coefficients. Zone 4 is the Middle West which 
is also very poor. Zone 6 is the Sfax area, which is economically prosperous as one the main industrial center after Tunis and 
the Middle East. Zone7 is the Southwest where Tozeur oasis stands as an important producing area of dates. It is also an 
increasingly  prosperous  tourism  center.  Other  important  towns  in  this  area  are  Gafsa  (with  a  declining  production  of 
phosphates) and Kbelli. Zone 8 is the Southeast, which includes Gabes (relatively wealthy although less than Sfax), Mednine 
and Tataouine. Its coefficient in the prediction equation should be negative.  
As for the housing characteristics, the number of rooms per capita should be correlated with living standards. The 
omitted category for the housing type is „villa‟. Therefore, the coefficients of the remaining categories should have negative 
signs, especially for „arab house‟ and „hovel‟. Arab‟s houses are traditional houses that do not satisfy standard requirements 
of modern houses. Walls may not be straight. Construction materials used for roof, walls and floor are often of poor quality. 
The activities of members are likely to matter for living standards. The number of participants in the household 
budget  (nbbud)  and  the  number  of  male  and  female  active  members  (respectively  actifm,  actiff)  should  be  positively 
correlated with the living standard. The categories for professionals, managers, industrials and traders are omited in the 
prediction  equations.  Then,  except  for  the  category  Agrifar  (farmer),  the  included  professional  categories  should  have 
negative coefficients. The sign of the coefficient for farmer may be ambiguous because the questionnaire does not distinguish 
small and large producers.  Moreover, no information on the cultivated areas or on the agricultural activity is available.  
Education variables are often correlated with living standards. We omit the categories corresponding to university 
or the second cycle of the secondary level (at least 4 years of secondary education beyond the 6 years of primary education) 
for the education of the household head. The remaining categories are denoted: Illiterate (no education); Prim (6 years of 
primary education or less); Sec1 (3 years of secondary education or less). The coefficients of these dummy variables should 
be negative. Nbetud denotes the variable indicating the number of students in the household. Since education is likely to be a 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (7734 observations) 
 
Variables  Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Yearly total expenditure 



















































































































































































































































































 Table 3: Prediction Equations 
 
 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The living standard variable is the equivalent income. 
V1 : Version 1 estimation using Set I variables (regional variables). 
V2 : Version 2 estimation using Set II variables (Set I + demographic and dwelling variables). 
V3 : Version 3 estimation using Set III variables (Set II + occupation and schooling level of household head).  
Tobit : Censored (10) 
UQ01 : Uncensored quantile (0.1) regression. 
CQ01 : Censored (50) quantile (0.1) regression. 
P-value in parentheses. 7734 observations.  
Table 4: Variance of the Prediction Errors over the Variance of the Logarithms of Living Standards 
Whole population 



















Set I  0.897  0.908  0.900  2.291  1.146  3.251 
Set II  0.551  0.635  0.568  1.413  0.693  2.259 
Set III  0.473  0.546  0.490  1.223  0.589  1.991 
 
The poor under the first quintile 



















Set I  0.832  0.806  0.814  0.105  0.410  0.059 
Set II  0.420  0.408  0.406  0.080  0.210  0.062 
Set III  0.338  0.333  0.326  0.080  0.177  0.066 
 
The poor under the second quintile 



















Set I  0.845  0.826  0.825  0.120  0.370  0.134 
Set II  0.428  0.448  0.423  0.147  0.211  0.158 






Table 5: Measures of Targeting Efficiency for z = TD 280  
 
  P2 (in %)       Leakage  Undercoverage 











































































































































































The living standard variable is the equivalent income.  
Set I of independent variables includes only regional variables. Set II includes in addition to Set I, demographic 
and dwelling variables. Set III includes in addition to Set II, occupation and schooling level of household head. 
OLS 1: Transfers based on OLS 1 : Set I variables.  
OLS 2: Transfers based on OLS 2 : Set II variables.  
OLS 3: Transfers based on OLS 3 : Set III variables. 
TB10 1: Transfers based on Tobit censured at 10 percent with Set I variables. 
TB10 2: Transfers based on Tobit censured at 10 percent with Set II variables. 
TB10 3: Transfers based on Tobit censured at 10 percent with Set III variables.  
TB30 1: Transfers based on Tobit censured at 30 percent with Set I variables. 
TB30 2: Transfers based on Tobit censured at 30 percent with Set II variables. 
TB30 3: Transfers based on Tobit censured at 30 percent with Set 3 variables. 
QR10 1: Transfers based on quantile regressions centered on quantile 0.1 with Set I variables.  
QR10 2: Transfers based on quantile regressions centered on quantile 0.1 with Set II variables. 
QR10 3: Transfers based on quantile regressions centered on quantile 0.1 with Set III variables. 
QR30 1: Transfers based on quantile regressions centered on quantile 0.3 with Set 1 variables. 
QR30 2: Transfers based on quantile regressions centered on quantile 0.3with Set II variables.  
QR30 3: Transfers based on quantile regressions centered on quantile 0.3with Set I variables. 
QRC01 1: Transfers based on censored quantile regressions centered on quantile 0.3, censored at quantile 0.5, 
with Set I variables.  
QRC01 2: Transfers based on censored quantile regressions centered on quantile 0.3, censored at quantile 0.5,  
with Set II variables.  
QRC01 3: Transfers based on censored quantile regressions centered on quantile 0.3, censored at quantile 0.5,  
with Set III variables. 
Pro-Poor Uniform OLS3: Uniform transfers based on OLS 3 : Set III variables. 
Pro-Poor Uniform QR10 3: Uniform transfers based on quantile regressions centered on quantile 0.1 with Set III 
variables. 
 
Each of measures presented in this table has been multiplied by 100 for easy interpretation.  




Appendix 2: Robustness checks with two other poverty lines 
 
 
Table for z = TD 360  
 
 
  P2 (in %)       Leakage  Under-coverage 
       
OLS 1 
 
1.93  69.0  47.3 
OLS 2 
 
1.31  50.4  29.9 
OLS 3 
 
1.17  48.1  27.3 
TB10 1 
 
2.10  60.0  47.3 
TB10 2 
 
1.32  47.7  33.2 
TB10 3 
 
1.17  44.9  31.4 
TB30 1 
 
1.93  69.5  47.3 
TB30 2 
 
1.28  48.6  29.7 
TB30 3 
 
1.12  46.6  26.6 
QR10 1 
 
1.98  61.9  16.9 
QR10 2 
 
1.26  50.1  16.6 
QR10 3 
 
1.07  47.3  15.3 
QR30 1 
 
1.98  63.7  37.6 
QR30 2 
 
1.24  49.0  23.1 
QR30 3 
 
1.05  48.3  20.7 
QRC01 1 
 
1.98  61.9  16.9 
QRC01 2 
 
1.39  50.5  15.9 
QRC01 3 
 


















Table for z = TD 225  
 
 
  P2 (in %)       Leakage  Under-coverage 
       
OLS 1 
 
.311  93.8  38.2 
OLS 2 
 
.154  85.4  17.5 
OLS 3 
 
.134  86.5  16.0 
TB10 1 
 
.344  82.0  38.2 
TB10 2 
 
.141  82.0  18.1 
TB10 3 
 
.116  82.0  15.6 
TB30 1 
 
.312  94.5  38.2 
TB30 2 
 
.140  83.9  16.8 
TB30 3 
 
.118  85.3  14.3 
QR10 1 
 
.272  84.3  12.6 
QR10 2 
 
.092  83.0  6.76 
QR10 3 
 
.071  84.0  7.05 
QR30 1 
 
.312  87.3  32.9 
QR30 2 
 
.118  83.9  11.2 
QR30 3 
 
.098  87.8  10.1 
QRC01 1 
 
.272  84.3  12.6 
QRC01 2 
 
.112  81.0  7.14 
QRC01 3 
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Graph 4: Decile−reg. unif. transfers
The vertical lines are poverty lines at 225, 280 and 360 TD
Figure 1: Ex Post and Ex Ante Targeting Errors
®